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NET INCOME AND JUDICIAL ECONOMICS 
No. 6 
A LEGAL system does not function in a vacuum of abstrac-tions. It is part of a general institutional framework of an 
organized society. Its content is determined by concrete individual 
and social needs and activities. Hence modern jurisprudence con-
ceives of law as a means for securing interests. The appraisal of 
its rules and principles requires an evaluation of the significant 
elements of the situation to which they apply. A narrow, compla-
cent formalism is the penalty of failure in this regard. No one 
would deny the emphasis modern society places upott its commer-
cial and industrial interests, nor the many points of contact between 
its legal and economic systems. Their problems are so inextricably 
interwoven that the proper answer to questions of law frequently 
turns on correct economic analysis. If the advent of income taxes 
has done nothing else, it has at least forcibly emphasized that fact. 
One phase of this inter-relation will be considered in the following 
discussion, namely, the determination of legal rights involving 
questions of income. 
The income question with which courts deal most frequently is, 
what constitutes net income. This is a fairly definite concept to 
the economist and accountant. To them it denotes an objective 
fact, mathematically ascertainable by applying to the financial facts 
of operation for a given period a formula of recognized accounting 
practice. It connotes a definite order of arranging those facts in 
accordance with economic principles: first, the summation of the 
items that make up gross income; next, the deduction of outlays 
I 
properly chargeable in arriving at net income; and last, the dispo-
sition of net income. 
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The principal defect of the legal treatment of income questions 
has been due to a failure to distinguish between the last two. The 
difference between them can be explained by applying the require-
ments of the Interstate Commerce Commission's accounting classi-
. fications to a concrete case. If a railroad constructs new mileage 
out of current earnings, it is not permitted to show the cost as a 
deduction in computing its net income, but must show it as an 
appropriation of net income. The distinction was recognized in 
G. R. {7 I. Ry. Co. v. Doyle1 (a tax case), 1n the-following language: 
"It is a well-known fact that corporations in general, both rail-
way and manufacturing companies, often use a part of their net 
earning~ or income in the extension and improvement of their 
plants and property and business. * * * But amounts so expended 
in additions are no less income than they would be if paid to the 
stockholder as dividends." 
The proper constituent elements of gross income have received 
practically no discussion in judicial opinions except in tax cases, 
which have not been considered herein. The problem frequently 
arises in receiverships where the receiver, without adopting the 
lease, continues to operate leased properties during the trial period 
allowed by ·1aw. The receiver is held under such circumstances 
to ·satisfy his entire duty by turning over to the lessor the entire 
net earnings of the demised premises. The net earnings of a leased 
railroad cannot be correctly computed without imputing to it its 
proper share of the gross earnings from joint traffic. This ques-
tion was squarely raised in a case involving a railroad lease under 
which the rent was to be increased as soon as the "gross revenues" 
of the , leased road exceeded a stipulated sum. The leased lines 
were operated as an integral part of the lessee's system, and the 
lessor's right to the increa~ed rental depended ultimately upon 
fixing a proper measure for the division of the receipts from joint 
traffic. Unfortunately for this discussion, the case was ultimately 
settled out of court. Courts have usually held that, in income bond 
cases, the obligor may not mingle the accounts of the mortgaged 
property with those of the system of which it is a part. The appli-
cation of this rule raises the identical question. The decisions 
point out the situations in which the problem arises, but give no 
1 245 Fed. j92. 
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clue to the solution. The Interstate Commerce Commission has 
frequently dealt with the same or analogous questions in passing 
on the division of through rates, proportional rates and switching 
charges. Its rulings would assuredly have weight with any court 
confronted with the situations suggested in this paragraph, but are 
beyond the scope of this treatment. In the absence of definite 
decisions on the first phase of income determination, the cases 
analyzed are limited to those involving the propriety of income 
charges and the differentiation between capital and expense. 
The distinction between capital and expense was called a "fun-
damental" one in. Kansas City So. Ry. Co. v. U. S.2 That case 
involved the validity of certain accounting regulations of the Inter-
State Commerce Commission, requiring the estimated replacement 
cost (less salvage value) of property abandoned as an incident to 
making permanent improvements to be charged to operating 
expenses. The company contended that, due to the extensive aban-
donment of property incident to shifting part of its line to improve 
the gradient, the regulation would so reduce the year's net earn-
ings as to render necessary the suspension of dividends on its pre-
f erred stock. It wished to charge the abandoned property to profit 
and loss, the accumulateq earnings of the past. The regulation was 
alleged to be so unreasonable as to constitute a violation of the 
Fifth Amendment. In discussing this aspect of the case the court 
said: 
"We are thus brought back to the fundamental distinction 
between (a) property or capital accounts, designed to rep-
resent the investment of the stockholders, and to show the 
cost of the property as originally acquired, with subsequent 
additions and improvements ; these assets being balanced by 
the liabilities, including the amount of the capital stock and 
of bonded and other indebtedness, with net profits or sur-
plus, whether carried under the head of 'profit and loss' or 
otherwise; and (b) the operating accounts, designed to show, 
on the one side, gross receipts or gross earnings for the year, 
and on the other side, the expenditures involved in producing 
those gross earnings and in maintaining __ the property, the 
balance being net earnings." 
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Although admitting that the alternative treatment contended for 
by the carrier might be equally reasonable, it held that the regula-
tion was not invalid. It recognized the absolute necessity of making 
and observing the distinction between capital and expense for the 
Commission's proper performance of its regulatory duties. 
The public interest in rate cases requires that fundamental dis-
tinction to be carefully adhered to. The control now exercised 
over the accounts of public service industries by public boards has 
universally enforced its observance. Before the day of such effec-
tive supervision, courts uniformly protected those interests by 
closely following correct accounting principles: The reasonable 
rate which the public can be required to pay must cover all operat-
ing expenses and provide in addition a fair return on the property 
devoted to its use. Justice to the public demands the rigorous 
exclusion of capital expenditures from operating expenses ; and 
r~quires that permanent accretions to property paid for out of earn-
ings be charged to income after, not before, reaching the net return. 
Every expenditure for additions and betterments increases the rate 
base pari passu, whether it is included in operating expenses or not. 
Their inclusion therein merely builds up a secret reserve of prop-
erty not shown among the book as$ets. If book figures were taken 
as conclusive evidence of fair value in rate cases, the only injury 
to the public would be the overcharge made in the first instance. 
Contemporary appraisals are, however, always relied on to estab-
lish such values, and these inevitably include the property built up 
through loading the expense accounts with capital items. No case 
has yet held that property thus acquired is not to be considered in 
determining the rate base. Unless expense charges are rigorously 
limited to true expense items, the public may find itself compelled 
to pay a fair return on what is in substance its own capital contri-
bution. Because expenditures for additions and improvements 
"increased the value of the company's property to the extent of 
such expenditures," they were thrown out of operating expenses 
in Catting v. Kansas City Stockyards,3 and practically every later 
rate case. The rule does not prohibit a public service company 
3 82 Fed. 850. Cons. Gas. Co. v. N. Y., 157 Fed. 849; Spring Valley 
Water Works v. San Francisco, 192 Fed. 137. 
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from using its earnings for additions ; it merely requires them to 
be paid for with its own share. 
The proper observance of this separation is necessary not only 
to protect the public against the companies, but also to secure a 
fair distribution of the burden of capital costs as between different 
consumers. The essential fact about capital is that it gives off a 
series of services extending over more than a single income period. 
It squares better with the equities of the situation to require its 
cost to be borne by all users of those services than to load it on 
those that use them during the period when the outlay is made. 
As stated by the Supreme Court in Ill. Cent. R. Co. v. I. C. C. :4 
"On principle it would seem * * * as if expenditures for additions 
to construction and equipment, as expenditures for original con-
struction and equipment, should be reimbursed by all of the traffic 
they accommodate during the period of their duration, and that 
improvements that will last many years should not be charged 
wholly against the revenues of a single year." On the whole, where 
public rights have turned on the proper analysis of income questions, 
courts have acquitted themselves very creditably. 
The picture is not as uniformly favorable when considering cases 
in which purely private claims were contingent on income factors. 
These most often involved the rights of various classes of corpo-
rate security holders to interest or dividends. The income bond 
cases furnish the best illustrative material. The distinctive char-
acteristic of an income bond is that the payment of interest is con-
tingent upon the e:>.."1stence of net income. It was frequently issued 
to junior lien holders in railroad reorganizations. The interest 
was invariably non-cumulative. The psychological effect of calling 
it a bond was to induce in the owner a feeling of security that sub-
sequent events usually belied. It was a standing temptation to 
corporate officials to perpetrate what, if not actual legal fraud, was 
a close blood relation. This, coupled with the perfunctory manner 
in which the mortgage trustee usually performed its duties, resulted 
in controversies that ultimately landed in the courts. 
The federal court for the western district of Louisiana recently 
passed on the right of income bondholders to interest under the 
4 206 U. S. 44r. 
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following state of facts." The Texas & Pacific Railway Company 
had issued a series of such bonds pursuant to the reorganization 
agreement of 1886. The mortgage securing it provided for the 
payment of interest "out of the net income of the Railway Com-
pany, as the same may be determined by the board of directors." 
In casting the income account to determine whether there was any 
net income, the di;ectors charged it with all manner of capital items. 
These were generally concealed among the operating expenses until 
the regulations of the Interstate Commerce Commission made that 
practice;! illegal. Thereafter income was appropriated for capital 
r.equirements prior to arriving at what the company considered net 
income under .the bond and mortgage. These facts were not denied. 
The contract was s;onstrued as vesting the directors "with discre-
tion to determine that the net income of the road was such portion 
of the gross earnings as might remain unexpended after the press-
ing needs of the road had been taken care of." 
The directors were held not to have been "reduced to the level 
of auditors and bookkeepers to mathematically determine what is 
net income, according to the theoretical dictum of expert account-
ants." This conclusion was based in part upon the argument that 
safety and economy of operation, the charter duties of the company 
to the public, and the mortgage provisions themselves required the 
road to be improved and built up, and that a company whose bor-
rowing powers were exhausted could do these things only out of 
earnings.. The mortgage provisions relied on were the usual mort-
gagor's covenants found in such instruments, whether securing 
income or fixed interest bonds. They have never before been inter-
preted as intended to define the contingency on which interest was 
payable on income bonds, and owe their importance in this case to 
an illogical application of the rule that the intention of the parties 
is to be gathered "from the four corners of the instrument." The 
bondholders must have inten.ded the directors to have that power, 
says the court, because at the time of issue it was apparent that 
'interest could not be earned for some time to come, and perhaps 
not at all unless the road were improved. Had the court realized 
5 B. F. Bush, Receiver, v. The Texas & Pac. R. R. Co., not officially 
reported. 
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the full implication of its decision on the economic interests of the 
bondholders, it could not have been convinced by its own arguments. 
The decision shows that general principles -not only do not solve 
concrete cases, but may even afford a convenient protection against 
the necessity of a too rigorous analysis of difficult technical points. 
Substantial rights and interests are always sacrificed whei;i. abstract' 
principles are formally applied in disregard of the actualities of 
the situation. If net income is what this court says it is, it becomes 
a variable function of directorial discretion, and the creditor's 
right to interest is made to depend on _the debtor's will and judg-
ment, subject only to the limits of non-fraudulent dealing. This 
is a correct statement of the powers of directors over the declara-
tion of dividends on stock; their duty towards income bondholders 
should in fairness be measured by some more objective standard. 
The consequences of such a subjective test on the relative economic 
positions of the income bondholders and stockholders are so con-
trary to current notions of justice that reason dictates its adoption 
only as a last resort. The case of Edwards v. International Pave-
ment Co.6 involved a bond in which the definition of net income 
violated every correct principle. The bond expressly authorized 
the directors to deduct every outlay, whether for expense or cap-
ital purposes, in determining net income. Nothing can be done in 
such a case to protect those who have incorporated their folly in 
contract form. The folly of one should not, however, be made the 
measure of the rights of wiser and more careful bargainers; nor 
should a presumption exist in construing a contract that the parties 
intended a fool's bargain. If one interpretation produces results 
both reasonable and just, and another the opposite effects, it is 
neither good law nor sense to adopt the latter. The court in the 
Texas & Pacific case was confronted with that alternative; it chose 
the worse position. This will be apparent from a consideration 
of the following implications of its doctrine. 
Income bondholders are creditors, not stockholders. No one 
would dispute the proposition that they did not loan their capital 
from motives of philanthropy, but solely to get an income. It is 
equally certain that, given parties of fairly equal bargaining skill 
a 227 Mass. 2o6. 
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and power, a lender would not contract to waive interest during 
the time that the borrower was increasing his wealth through the 
use of the former's capital. A definition that permits the deduc-
tion of capital expenditures in computing the net income by which 
the duty to pay interest is fixed converts an income bond into just 
such an agreement. At the beginning of any income period the 
corporate assets amount to a given sum contributed by both the 
bondholders and stockholders. The balance of the gross earnings 
from operation after deducting operating expenses and fixed 
charges-that is, those outlays for which the corporation receives 
assets that are entirely consumed during the period in producing 
those earnings-constitute net additions to corporate property. It 
is immaterial in what form this increment is retained; its applica-
tion to capital improvements represents a mere conversion in the 
form of assets, neither increasing nor decreasing them. 
Permitting capital expenditures to be deducted in arriving at net 
income is thus equivalent to authorizing the debtor to retain for its 
own uses an equal part of the net property accretion for the period, 
to appropriate to itself a part of the true net earnings. The 
debtor could avoid the payment of interest during the entire life 
of the bonds by carrying on a sufficiently large program of addi-
tions and improvements. It would thus secure the free use of the 
c_apital of others, not only while increasing its own wealth, but just 
because of that fact. A portion 9f the annual earnings might con-
ceivably be reserved to provide a sinking fund to retire the income 
·bonds at maturity, and creditors thus be compelled to pay the prin-
cipal of their claim with what they would otherwise have received 
as interest. The doctrine affects the debtor's position as favorably 
as it affects the creditor's adversely. The retention of the net earn-
ings pari passit increases corporate surplus or decreases the deficit, 
and proportionately enhances the real value of the stock. This 
constitutes as real a receipt of the retained or reinvested earnings 
by the stockholder as if they had been distributed as dividends. 
The surplus belongs to him, and can subsequently be capitalized 
by a stock dividend. 
Thus the creditor's claim for interest is subordinated to that of 
the stockholder to appropriate the first fruits of the venture in 
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which their joint capital is embarked. The bondholder benefits 
only in the increased security of his principal, a reason sometimes 
alleged to justify the doctrine. The argument rests on a miscon-
ception in the case of long term bonds, except during the last ten 
or fifteen years of their life. The present value of the principal of 
such bonds is less than the present value of the series of interest 
payments e.'>:cept during such later period, the length of which varies 
with the discount rate applied. The argument, therefore, imputes 
to the bondholders a willingness to sacrifice the greater for the less. 
The foregoing analysis of the implications of the doctrine here dis-
cussed shows its absurdity. • 
Some of the arguments of the preceding paragraph were clearly 
stated by the supreme court of Georgia in Cent. of Ga. Ry. Co. v. 
The Central Trust Co. of New York.1 It discussed the company's 
right to deduct additions and betterments in arriving at net income 
in the following language: 
"Relatively to stockholders, directors have a broad discre-
tion in the application of income to the improvement of cor-
porate property, instead of apportioning some of it to divi-
dends. But an income bondholder, whose interest is only 
payable from the net income of the year in which the interest 
accrues, occupies a more favored position than that of a 
stockholder. A diversion of net income to betterments and 
expansion of the physical properties to the withholding of 
an annual dividend does not mean a loss to the stockholder, 
as the stockholder indirectly gets the dividend in the pres-
ently enhanced value of his stock. The bondholder, whose 
right to interest is immediate, which interest is forever lost 
if not paid from the income of the year in which the interest 
accrues, derives no present benefit from the diversion of 
income to betterments, but sustains a loss so far as interest 
is concerned, which can never be recouped. Even if the pay-
ment of the principal of his debt is better assured by suc-
cessive diversions of income, the income, if not paid, is for-
7 135 Ga. 472. Other income bond cases discussing various aspects of 
this question are: Barry v. M., K & T. Ry. Co., 27 Fed. I; Id., 34 Fed. 829; 
Hubbard v. Galveston, H. & S. A. Ry. Co., 200 Fed. 504; Yazoo & M. V. 
R. Co. v. Martin, 47 So. 667; Id., 4~ So. 739· 
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ever lost. And then, too, a bond payable 50 years hence has 
practically no commercial value unless there is some assur:. 
ance of interest pending its maturity." 
This language reflects a clear perception of the importance of a 
correct definition of net income on the financial interests of the 
parties. Creditors do not usually bargain for such results. A judi-
cial construction of a contract that produces them is almost certain 
to rest on.: incorrect analysis. The Georgia court did not reject "the 
refinements of later day theories," but made them a measure of 
directorial powers in dealing with the interests of contingent cred-
itors. It observed the distinction between capital and expense. 
Expenditures for enlarging the plant, equipment trust payments 
in excess of the depreciation on the equipment' covered by the agree-
ments, and amounts reserved for sinking funds were all disallowed 
as deductions in computing net income under the bond. No one 
will question that this decision accords better with current notions 
of justice than that in the other case, that it appraises the equities 
of the situation with a. finer regard for fair business dealing and a 
better grasp of fundamentals. 
The "interests of income bondholders and others with rights con-
tingent on net income have . usually been defeated through the 
improper correlation of two problems. Courts frequently stress 
the point in such cases that directors, as practical men, retain their 
authority to build up the mortgaged property. Such is the undoubted 
rule in the absence of specific contract limitations.8 That, however, 
does not logically mean that they have the power to charge the 
expenditures incurred in exercising that authority in any manner 
they see fit. To deduce the fatter power from the former authority 
involves a vicious non sequitur, based on an incorrect understanding 
of what is meant by determining net income. The two questions 
are frequently confused and identified. The one involves consid-
erations of business policy; the other is concerned with the manner 
of recording the financial results of such policies. A contract may 
very well leave directors full discretion in respect of the former 
8 Spies v. C. & E. I. R. Co., 40 Fed. 34; Day v. 0. & L. E. R. Co., 107 
N. Y. 129. In connection with the Day case, see also Thomas v. N. Y. & 
G. L. R. Co., 139 N. Y. 163; Buell v. B. & 0. S, W.R. Co., 53 N. Y. S. 749. 
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and yet impose limits in regard to the latter. The first essential to 
the correct determination of. the rights of income bondholders and 
those in similar circumstances is to make the above distinction. The 
court made it in Mackintosh v. Flint & P. M. R. Co.9 in the fol-
lowing language: "The policy thus adopted and pursued by the 
actual management assumed that the contingent rights and interests 
of the provisional certificate· holders were entirely subject to the 
discretion of the directors, or those in control of the road, in decid-
ing, not only what expenditures should be made, but how they 
should be charged, as between operating and construction." Where 
the two are confused the second is almost invariably answered 
incorrectly. The absence of specific limitations in respect of what 
expenditures may be made is construed as blanket authority to 
charge them at will. The definite limitation on the power to charge 
expenditures that the term net income itself implies receives no 
recognition, and thus the most effective guaranty of justice to con-
tingent creditors is lost. 
It is usual to give the grounds for a particular approach to a 
subject at the beginning rather than at the close of the discussion. 
This order has been deliberately reversed in the belief that the rea-
sons would be more easily stated and better understood by adopting 
that course. No definition of income, gross or net, emerges from 
the analysis of the cases reviewed; none was intended. The aim 
has been to present a picture of the process of translating economic 
fact into legal rule. The effectiveness of law as a social instrument 
varies directly with the extent to which it takes account of the extra-
legal factors of the situation that it aims to control. The rules it 
prescribes for economic relations will conform to accepted and well-
founded views of justice about in proportion as correct economic 
analysis contributes to their content. That is as ,true of other eco-
nomico-legal problems as of that one herein selected for illustrative 
purposes, for the relation between law and economics is a subject 
9 34 Fed. 582. It is this that explains the statement of the New York 
court in the Day case, note 8, supra, that the bond was "at most an agree-
ment to pay dividends if dividends are earned," and the <lecision in the 
Texas & Pacific case, text, supra, that no interest was payable if the earn-
ings had been applied by the -directors to additions and betterments author-
ized by them. 
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with ramifications as extensive as the points of contact between the 
legal and economic systems of modern society are numerous and 
diverse. 
Of the New York Bar. HENRY Ro'l'TSCHAEFER. 
